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The Space building was a residential complex located in the city of Medellín (Colombia),
which was divided into six stages or towers. In the last stage of the project, tower six suffered
a structural failure that caused its collapse, which led to the demolition of the other towers.
The main issues discussed are related to the design of structures, columns, beams, and loads
that a structure can withstand given the terrain and the materials used for construction. In
addition, the study carried out by the Universidad de Los Andes, which was the main source
of information in the investigation of the collapse and its aftermath, will be presented. This
article will collect and show information on this case in the areas directly related to civil
engineering and what happened to those involved in the project.
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El edificio Space fue un conjunto residencial ubicado en la ciudad de Medellín (Colombia),
el cual se dividía en seis etapas o torres. En la última etapa del proyecto, la torres seis,
sufrió una falla estructural que produjo el colapso de esta, y esto llevó a la demolición
de las demás torres. Los problemas principales que se trataron están relacionados con el
diseño de estructuras, columnas, vigas y cargas que puede soportar una estructura dadas las
situaciones del terreno y los materiales utilizados para la construcción. Además, se dará a
conocer el estudio realizado por la Universidad de Los Andes la cual fue la principal fuente
de información en la investigación del colapso y posteriormente a este. El presente artículo
recolectará y mostrará información de este caso en los ámbitos ligados directamente a la
ingeniería civil y lo ocurrido con los implicados en el proyecto.
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Introduction
The function of the bone system in the human body is to
support, to keep the body rigid internally and externally; the
same happens with buildings, these must-have their systems
that make them rigid to withstand any type of internal and
external force, therefore, the bone system of a building
consists mainly of columns and beams that provide the
necessary support for it to stand and support its weight.
If a component of this system were to fail in both cases,
the same thing would happen, it would lose support and
stiffness, which is why the good design of column and beam
proportions is very important (Fig. 1).
Figure 1. General structure (Alli, 2019).
Taking as a reference the concept given by the engineer
López (López, 2005) which defines structures as "the
structure is and has always been an essential component
of architecture and civil engineering, and it is precisely the
engineer and the architect who, during the design process,
must create and invent the structure and give it correct
proportions".
Bone structure design
Structural design is the creative process where the
structural system or skeleton of the building is carried out,
in addition to the calculations of the most viable materials
to carry out the construction (table 1). ARQHYS magazine
defines it as follows: "structural design is one of the areas
where civil engineering is developed and is carried out based
on the potential that a material can offer, as well as the
natural characteristics that make it specific, its low cost,
and its mechanical properties. A failure in the structure
can occur when the rigid part and the plastic part of the
element is in excess, however, if a good level of these two
is maintained it is likely to have optimum performance"
(Arohys, 2018).
Table 1
Conception of a structure (Arohys, 2018).
Parts of the building’s skeletal system
Concerning the bone systems of the building, it is
important to talk about the most important elements, called
columns and beams.
Columns are those that help to hold up the mezzanine or
other types of elements. The column is the vertical structural
element used to support the load of the building (Figs. 2 and
3). It is widely used in architecture because of the freedom it
provides to distribute spaces while fulfilling the function of
supporting the weight of the construction; it is a fundamental
element in the scheme of a structure and the proper selection
of its size, shape, spacing, and composition. They have a
direct influence on its load-bearing capacity (Gálves, 2017).
The beams are the ones that generate a horizontal load
force by supporting the weight and tension of the plates, the
dead and live loads of the building (Fig. 4).
The engineers at Arcus Global (construction company)
define beams as: "The beam is the construction element
on which the support of all the structures we see every
day depends. We must understand that beams are not only
intended to support pressure and weight, but also to do
bending and tension, it is a horizontal structure that can hold
load between two supports without creating lateral thrust,
they are ideal for bridges" (Arcus, 2018).
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Figure 2. Forces on a column (part A) (Bautista, 2019).
Figure 3. Forces on a column (part B) (Bautista, 2019).
Figure 4. Beams and loads.
Loads to be supported
There are three types of loads in construction (table 2).
Table 2
Types of loads in construction (Aguado, 1994).
Each component mentioned in the table above must resist
different types of loads that are fundamental to take into
account when designing beams and columns, since the
weight of the structure, in general, must be taken into account
so that no collapse of the structure is caused.
When carrying out a construction project it is very
important to take into account the loads that it must support
mainly from the design, with the intention that the building
in question supports its weight and the other loads that are
applied on the building. Taking the above into account, the
engineer must ensure that the materials to be used can meet
all the parameters of the project, either the weight of the
cement used in the walls and slabs, as well as the thickness
and type of rebar in the beams, columns, and slabs of the
entire building, being this part of the dead loads that are the
main part of the beginning of the project.
Structural walls
Walls have great importance in the design of loads in
the structure. Walls are those construction elements with
a parallelepiped shape, in which the dimensions of length
and height dominate over that of thickness, which primarily
fulfills resistant structural missions (transmitting loads of
the floors and roofs) and those required insulation functions
(phonic and hygrothermal) as well as adequate fire resistance
(Diéguez, 2002).
According to their design and mission, they are divided
into two main categories (Fig. 5).
Load-bearing walls. If they are not only self-supporting but
are also subjected to external loads and thrusts.
Dividing walls. When they have compartmentalization
missions and are fundamentally subjected to the action
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of their weight and without other mechanical actions
than self-supporting.
Figure 5. Structural design of a building (Poston, 2019).
Wall symmetry
To verify the distribution of the symmetry of the walls,
first, the respective distributions of the walls must be made
in the sketch of the plan to be presented, it should be noted
that the lengths of the walls that go in the same direction must
be similar for greater torsional rigidity in the building. The







∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0.15 (1)
Eq. 1 tells us that there is a margin or area of error allowed
to consider the house as symmetrical, this margin tells us that
our real axis of symmetry, calculated for the proposed design
must have a maximum of 15% offset from the theoretical axis
to the real axis of the house, which would be half the length
of the house, expressed with the letter B (Agudelo, 2019).
Footings
The footing is a shallow foundation normally used in soils
with medium or high compressive strength, on homogeneous
soils (Fig. 6). Its function is to anchor and transmit the
stresses generated by a structure to the ground on which it is
located. It is located at the base of the structure and is usually
found as a concrete prism under the pillars (or columns)
of the structure. The division of the footings is detailed in
table 3.
A disaster foretold
The Space building in Medellín (Fig. 7) was a project
with more than 200 apartments in six stages built on 10,800
square meters by the construction company CDO in the
Poblado neighborhood in 2006, which was planned to be
built in an area considered unusable by the Mayor’s Office
of Medellín in the Land Management Plan (POT) (Alvarez,
Figure 6. Spread footing in foundation plane (Geotecnia,
2019).
Table 3
Footing types (Arcus, 2017).
2017). In 2013, the construction phase of Tower 6 and the
entire building was completed.
Figure 7. Space building structure design (Suárez, 2019).
Problems in the combined structural system began to
become evident in the columns that were the first to fail
and the plates began to sag, in addition, cracking was seen
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in many main and dividing walls of Tower 6 (Fig. 8). On
Friday morning, October 11, 2013, the inhabitants of the
Space Building contacted the Administrative Department of
Disaster Risk Management (DAGRD) because a column of
Stage 6 had failed (Toro, Yepes, & Castaño, 2016). This
entity observed the problems and the structural failure of
the column, therefore, decided to evacuate Stage 6 of the
Space Building. For which the construction company stated:
"There is no danger for the rest of the building where no
structural failure was found".
Figure 8. Photographs of the columns before collapse
(Suárez, 2019).
But a few hours after the press release, on October
12, 2013, at night, Tower 6 collapsed (Redaccion, 2013).
According to the study conducted and the conclusions
delivered to the Mayor’s Office by the Universidad de Los
Andes, the collapse of stage 6 was mainly related to the lack
of structural capacity of the columns of the Space Building.
These, according to the study, were not able to withstand the
normal loads to which they were subjected.
The primary cause of the collapse of the SPACE building
lies in the lack of structural capacity of the building’s main
columns to resist the acting loads due to the structure’s
weight and the imposed service loads (Fig. 9). In particular,
the columns of the R-3 and S-3 axes presented acting
loads that exceeded their capacities at critical points, which
caused them to present structural failure by compression on
February 20, 2013, and October 11, 2013, the latter one day
before the collapse of the building. The lack of structural
capacity is associated with deficiencies in the sizing and
design of the main structural elements (columns, beams, and
slabs).
There is evidence that the building suffered from internal
structural problems and pathologies in the months and days
before the collapse which include cracks and crevices in
masonry partition walls, excessive vertical deflections in
the floor slabs, and structural failures in at least two main
columns of the building (Fig. 10) (Buitrago, Callejas, &
Moreno, 2018; Toro et al., 2016).
Figure 9. Lack of continuity in structural walls (Suárez,
2019).
Figure 10. Cracks and fissures in dividing walls (Suárez,
2019).
According to the NRS in Title B (loads) a structure must




• Forces caused by imposed deformations
• Analysis
From which the SPACE building did not comply with item
A, since the materials used in the plates, columns, and beams
were not adequate to support the weight of the building and
which was one of the main causes of the collapse of the
building, from the above it began to investigate whether the
materials used failed, of which engineers warn that in general
imported materials that are not of good quality were used
in the construction. Particularly with the steel, which is
what keeps the beams that support the structure of the entire
building standing.
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After the collapse of Tower 6, the other towers were
demolished because it was concluded that all of them
had structural design flaws after studies conducted by the
Universidad de Los Andes and the prosecutor’s office said:
"the columns were not thick enough to support their weight.
In addition, it found that there were 5,500 transgressions
to the seismic resistance standard in the entire residential
complex" (Fig. 11).
Figure 11. Demolition of towers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Mercado,
2019).
To establish the most probable causes of the collapse, the
investigators ruled out hypotheses about possible external
events such as earthquakes, landslides, explosions or internal
fires, and extraordinary overloads on the building, other than
those established in the analysis of the structural conditions
of the building itself. It was identified that the building
presented several pieces of evidence of internal structural
problems and pathologies in the months and days before the
collapse (table 4) (SCI, 2014).
Table 4
Structural problems identified.
The analytical evaluations of structural reliability indicate
that the probability of failure of the building, in the
conditions in which it was found at the end of the
deconstruction phase, was close to 100%. It was also
found that, had the building’s columns been adequately sized
following current regulations, the probability of failure of
the building’s critical column would have been very low
(less than 0.1%), even considering the occurrence of the
differential settlements recorded.
In the opinion of the specialists and experts of the
Universidad de Los Andes, if the structure of the SPACE
building had been designed in compliance with all the
applicable requirements of Law 400 of 1997 and its
Regulatory Decrees (NSR-98), Stage 6 would not have
collapsed as it did under the imposed conditions (AIR, 2014).
It could be concluded as a result of the tragedy that if all
the structural requirements stipulated in Law 400 of 1997
had been fully complied with, which refers to the standards
for seismic-resistant constructions, and which in its first
article refers to the minimum criteria and requirements for
the design, construction and technical supervision of new
buildings, as well as those essential for the recovery of the
community after the occurrence of an earthquake, which may
be subjected to seismic forces and other forces imposed by
nature or use, to be able to withstand them, increase their
resistance to the effects they produce, minimize the risk of
loss of human lives, and defend as far as possible the heritage
of the State and citizens (MinAmbiente, 1997).
The main idea that this law wants to make clear with the
above article is that each construction must have compliance
with each minimum requirement that is presented in the
course of this law, which was not fully implemented in
the development of the construction of the Space building,
without taking into account the risks that would cause and
caused if the building failed, which happened and took the
lives of 12 people and left homeless many others who lived
in each of the 5 remaining towers that had to collapse.
A building designed according to the requirements
established in the standards that regulate seismic-resistant
constructions must be able to resist, in addition to the forces
imposed by its use, low-intensity tremors without damage,
moderate tremors without structural damage, but possibly
with some damage to nonstructural elements, and a strong
tremor with damage to structural and nonstructural elements,
but without collapse. Care in design and construction
and technical supervision is fundamental for the seismic
resistance of structures and nonstructural elements.
The article also stresses the importance of preventing a
collapse from the design of the structure, which must be on
a ground that can withstand the conditions to which it will
be subjected, and which was the main cause of many people
being endangered if the structure fails, as in the SPACE case.
Although this case, unfortunately, served to alert the
mayor’s office of Medellin since in the El Poblado sector
there were also large buildings such as the Continental
Tower and Asensi building, which also had serious structural
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failures, these 3 buildings share a similarity which is the
construction firm COD, in the next chapter we will discuss
legal issues of the officials involved in the construction of the
Space building and everything related to the post-collapse of
the building.
The effects of an error
Following the consequences of the collapse and
demolition of the other towers, an investigation was carried
out to find out what happened and to provide a solution to
the problem.
In the case of Continental Towers, one of the buildings
evacuated shortly after the collapse of the Space tower,
according to the specialist Roberto Rochel, professor at Eafit,
it is better to demolish it than to repair it (Fig. 12). The fact
that not one but several buildings were evacuated to study
their structures, both in El Poblado and in other areas of the
city, highlights the probable existence of a systemic problem
and not a specific one (Mundo, 2013).
Figure 12. Continental Tower photo, October 2018 (Sánchez,
2019).
After the collapse of tower 6 of the Space building in
the El Poblado sector in Medellin, to the disbelief of the
people of Antioquia, who believed that these towers were
made to last until the end of time, the disbelief increased even
more, when several buildings were evacuated for possible
construction deficiencies and that had been built or were
being built by the company CDO as the Continental Tower
building which was one of the buildings evacuated a few days
after the collapse of Tower 6, The fact that not one but several
buildings were evacuated to study their structures, both in
El Poblado and in other areas of the city, highlights the
probable existence of a systemic problem and not a specific
one (Fig. 13). This case helps to demonstrate that people
trust in the durability and resistance that a structure may
have because of its aesthetics or architectural design, but they
do not see the internal part of the structure which was the
cause of the collapse that over time became more evident;
the damage to the columns, the cracks that were created in
the main walls and finally a sudden collapse.
Figure 13. Lot of the Space building after demolition (Sáenz,
2019).
As of today, the COD company has not given any response
to the owners of the apartments in the Continental Tower
building because of the failure to comply with a ruling of
the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce, in January
2016, which ordered the construction firm Alsacia CDO
to return 13,380 million pesos to about 70 owners of the
development (Tiempo, 2018).
The maximization of profits by optimizing materials and
spaces to the limit was expressed with the collapse of Space
and other buildings that may have to be demolished or
repaired, this semi-paralyzed the real estate trade of high-rise
buildings in Medellin, especially in the El Poblado sector,
which at the time was an alternative to obtaining great
wealth, appropriating the urban surplus value.
The topography of El Poblado sets limits to real estate
greed, and nature has sent its deadly messages with the
Cola del Zorro and Alto Verde landslides in recent years.
These kinds of events may be repeated in the future given
the characteristics of the creeping, shifting soil in the hills
of El Poblado. However, the Space event is unique in that
it is not caused by nature, an earthquake, or an earthquake.
Space fell to a long experienced and renowned company due
to possible structural failures. Only in Medellín, the most
innovative city, paradoxically, does a building fall due to
construction failures. In this sense, it is imperative for the
authorities, starting with the Mayor and the City Council,
to take advantage of the crisis to impose stricter and more
severe conditions for construction in El Poblado and the city
in general through the POT.
A study by anthropologist Paula Sanín Naranjo, March
2010. As a consequence of the approval of Medellin’s
Land Use Plan in 1999, considerable benefits were given to
the subdivision structure, which generated great advantages
for building activity and triggered construction activity. A
disproportionate growth in an area is considered a symbol
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of prestige and exclusivity. To such an extent that in recent
years 30% of the city’s buildings are in El Poblado.
With growing problems of traffic congestion and
environmental pollution, this alternative center of Medellín,
in addition to being a reference of better social status,
represents the first context to be clarified regarding the
collapse of tower 6 of the Space building. In a relatively short
time, the area went from being a rural and rural territory close
to the mountains in the southeastern sector of the city to an
active commercial and housing area, with multiple apartment
buildings and a sense of collective security, but a poorly
planned development.
In this perspective, after the collapse of tower 6 of
the Space building, which destroyed 84 apartments in
seconds, the first questions fell on the Second Curator’s
Office of Medellín. It is worth remembering that the
curators emerged in 1994 to decongest the planning offices
of the municipalities and speed up the processing of
construction licenses, which sometimes took up to five years.
The problem is that the issue went the other way and,
particularly in Medellín, the real estate boom multiplied their
management (Espectador, 2013).
After the disaster, it is now clear that there is a need for
more control over the activity of the curators. At least in the
capital of Antioquia, with the POT updated in 2006, which
stimulated construction in areas such as El Poblado, it is
clear that greater vigilance is urgently needed. In the case
of the second curator Carlos Alberto Ruiz, today in the eye
of the hurricane, he is initially questioned for being the one
who granted the urbanization license for the general project
and then approved the different stages of construction of the
residential unit.
One of the consequences of ignoring or failing to
comply with parts of the seismic-resistant standard was the
modification of said standard; the engineers who performed
the calculations decided to leave aside parts of Law 400
of 1997 (standards on seismic-resistant constructions are
adopted); in addition, 10,678 transgressions were made to
technical seismic-resistance standards. It was determined
that the seismic design parameters were not established
or defined and that the mezzanine slabs did not have the
minimum stiffness required to limit deflections or other
deformations that could impair the strength and functionality
of the structure.
One of the changes was the issuance of law 1796 of
2016 known as ’safe housing law’ whose purpose is focused
on generating measures towards the protection of the home
buyer, increase in the safety of buildings, strengthening the
public function exercised by urban curators, and likewise
establishing other functions to the superintendence of notary
and registry.
The issuance of this new law also brought modifications
to Law 400 of 1997 in articles (15, 18, 19) affecting the
technical regulation of seismic resistant constructions (NSR),
as well as creating the national registry of professionals
for the NSR accredited to carry out design, review, and
supervision of Law 400 of 1997.
It should be noted that one of the causes of the
construction of the towers is due to negligence on the part of
the urban curator Carlos Alberto Ruiz Arango, who granted
the construction licenses for the different phases of the Space
building, after which the Attorney General’s Office decided
to dismiss him and disqualify him for 8 years.
Edgar Mauricio Ardila Vélez (structural reviewer of the
project), Pablo Villegas Mesa (legal representative of the
construction company LERIDA CDO), María Cecilia Posada
Grisales (engineering director of the work), and Bernardo
Antonio Vieco Quiros (responsible for the soil study), all of
whom had their professional licenses canceled for different
periods as shown in table 5.
Table 5
Detail of penalties imposed on employees.
Another effect of having made the wrong calculations,
designs, etc., resulted in a request from the Medellín mayor’s
office to the engineering faculty of the Universidad de Los
Andes to carry out the pertinent studies, evaluations, and
diagnoses in four phases (Andes, 2015).
1. Preparation of a technical concept on the Space
building about compliance or non-compliance with the legal
technical standards applicable to the design and construction
processes of the foundation, structure, and non-structural
elements.
2. Development of a concept, supported by international
experts, on the general conceptualization of the project, the
main shortcomings, and problems it presented in light of the
state of the art of knowledge and applicable world practice.
3. Conduct the detailed technical studies required to
assess the most probable causes of the collapse of Stage 6
of the Space building.
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4. Studies, evaluations, diagnoses, and recommendations
about the Continental Towers and Asensi buildings for
which the Mayor’s Office required a technical concept
for decision-making purposes related to their safety and
functionality.
Conclusions
It has been a little more than five years since the collapse
of this building, which has generated great uncertainty about
the work of civil engineers when undertaking a project of this
size, but despite this, it has left a cold lesson to engineering
to take more precautions about the area where it is built,
the design and the materials used, since it is a residential
construction and the first factor to take into account is the
safety of the people who live in it, since that is the main
objective of the engineer to create structures that support
everything to which it is subjected.
These collapses are not only related to negligence on
the part of those in charge of the construction, but also
to corruption in these projects, since unauthorized cuts are
made in materials and studies related to the building.
In this article we wanted to show the crude reality facing
our country, negligence on the part of our large construction
companies and professionals in the field of civil engineering
since we do not know if more constructions like these,
fortunately, have not yet collapsed; another purpose of this
article is to inform the people who were always interested in
why this building collapsed since unfortunately there was no
good information about this case in the media.
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